By: Scott Horlbeck
The NBA has turned into a pick-and-roll league. That’s not a ground-breaking take, not a hot take, and note even a remotely mild take. It just is what it is. And if you have an offensive player – or a pair of players – that can execute the pick-and-roll to perfection, with counter after counter depending on how the defense plays you, you’re going to be a pretty hard team to stop.
-== Top 11 Steph Curry Moments Of His Career ==-
If you didn’t know, the Steph Curry – Draymond Green pick-and-roll is one of the deadliest plays in the league. Zach Lowe wrote about it in his Conference Finals Preview, saying the Curry-Green PNR produced more points per play than almost every other PNR combo in the league, according to SportsVU data.
In Game 3, and like most other games, the Warriors relied heavily on the Curry-Green PNR. However, for the first time this series, the Rockets defended the lethal play in a different way: they switched.
You can’t blame them for trying a new strategy. Curry has lit up the Rockets for 67 points in the first two games of the series – much of which coming off the Green PNR.
Switching the Curry-Green PNR is a sound strategy if the player being switched onto Curry is capable of guarding him. Many teams do it, most often by putting a smaller more agile player on Green, so he is more capable of guarding Curry once the switch occurs.
Only problem, Josh Smith was that guy in Game 3.
Example #1: Curry comes off the Green screen, Smith switches out onto him, Curry immediately notices the switch and flings a left-handed hook pass to Green, who takes one dribble and throws a lob to Andrew Bogut for an easy dunk.
This doesn’t count as horrible defense, but it’s close. If your going to switch the screen, Smith needs to be much tighter on Curry. In this play, Smith looks hesitant to pressure Curry (can’t blame him), and that extra space results in a pass to Green for a 4 on 3 situation.
Example #2: Same play. Curry-Green PNR, Smith switches onto Curry, and this does a better job of pressuring the ball. Curry sees the switch, makes a hesitation dribble and blows by Smith for lay-up. I know he misses the layup but the defensive breakdown and high percentage shot for Curry is the point.
If the Rockets are going to keep switching Curry/Green pick and rolls, Josh Smith has to do better.
— Mike Prada (@MikePradaSBN) May 24, 2015
Example #3: (This is a longer play that started with a Curry-Green PNR) Green passes to Curry, who rips through on Smith and blows by him for an easy layup. At this point you have to think McHale will start Game 4 with Trevor Ariza on Green instead of Smith.
Example #4: Last one, I promise. After being torched in two different ways (blown by and a quick pass for a lob-dunk), Smith takes the conservative approach and attempts to go below the screen. You’ll notice Jason Terry drop back expecting Smith to switch onto Curry, which results in confusion, too much space and a Curry 3.
Different Looks For Harden
“I thought Harrison did a really good job (on Harden) early,” Adams said. “A different body, a different defensive presence (than Thompson). And then I thought we closed space behind him on some of the high picks we saw. But again, in being fair to James and their team, we played pretty much error-less ball.”
This is defensive mastermind Ron Adams talking to USA Today’s Sam Amick following the blow-out win for the Warriors. For those that don’t know, Adams is regarded as one of the best defensive minds in the league, and was one of Steve Kerr’s first hires after being named head coach.
After reading Amick’s piece last night, I decided to go back and re-watch Game 3 with Adams’ quotes in mind.
To no one’s surprise, Adams was dead on. Not only did the Warriors throw various defenders at Harden all night – Barnes, Andre Iguodala, Klay Thompson – they also did exactly what Adams described in his last sentence – “close space behind (Harden) on some of the high picks.”
This was something I didn’t catch the first time around, but that was probably the beer and pizza’s fault. On the re-watch, it’s so clear that this “closing of space” strategy was a focus point heading into the game.
Here’s an example:
As Harden drives left off the Dwight Howard screen, notice how tight Barnes stay with him. Just like Adams described. Harden feels the defender on his hip, and instead of rising for a jumper – like he did many times in games 1 & 2 – he decides to shoot a contested floater over two Warriors.
Here’s another example, this time with Thompson defending Harden.
Notice how tight Thompson stays with Harden off the Terrence Jones screen. (Adams whisper) And instead of rising for an elbow jumper, Harden takes an extra dribble, get’s caught in the air, and has to kick it out to Pablo Prigioni for a low-percentage three.
The Warriors also gave Harden some new looks in Game 3, particularly on his wings ISO’s.
As Harden begins his dribble, Festus Ezeli shuffles over for the double, with Thompson maintaining great ball pressure. With no dribble or open shot, Harden is forced to deliver a poor pass to tightly guarded Terrence Jones.
Here’s a similar play, but instead of a double, Steph Curry shadows Iguodala, shielding off the baseline drive. Harden sees Curry and decides to take a tough step-back jumper over Iguodala.
Finally, I think it’s important to say that while Harden did play his worst game of the series in Game 3, and much of that is the result of the Warriors pinpoint defensive schemes and execution, he also just missed shots.
I know that’s not a ground-breaking take, but Harden had a bad shooting night. It happens. But for players of his caliber, it probably won’t happen two games in a row.